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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
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Results for risk management
37 results foundAuthor: Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research Title: Research and Practice in Risk Asessment and Management of Children and Young People Engaging in Offending Behaviours: A Literature Review Summary: This study provides an evaluation of the literature on research and practice in relation to the risk assessment and risk management of children and young people engaging in offending behaviors, to be used to inform the Risk Management Authority's future work in these fields. The study incorporates two aspects: a review of national and international literature on the topic, with particular reference to violent offending and sexually harmful behavior, and a review of current practice in reference to the assessment and management of these young people at risk of harm and re-offending in Scotland. Details: Glasgow: Risk Mamangement Authority, 2007. 107p. Source: Year: 2007 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 113632 Keywords: Juvenile OffendersJuvenile Sex OffendersRisk AssessmentRisk ManagementViolent OffendersYoung Offenders |
Author: Austin, James Title: Reliability and Validity Study of the LSI-R Risk Assessment Instrument Summary: The Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (PBPP) selected the Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) instrument as its risk classification tool because it introduces dynamic and more current factors into the risk assessment process, beyond the conventional use of static criminal history and demographic factors. The LSI was developed in the late 1970s in Canada through a collaboration of probation officers, correctional managers, practitioners and researchers. The LSI-R is comprised of 54 static and dynamic items across ten sub-scales. While the LSI-R has been researched extensively in other jurisdictions, its reliability and validity specifically for Pennsylvania’s offender population had not yet been tested. Of particular interest is Pennsylvania’s decision to use the LSI-R as a component of its parole decision making guidelines; heretofore, the LSI-R has been used to identify the appropriate level of supervision for probationers and parolees already residing in the community. In this study, the LSI-R’s relevance and usefulness as a decision making tool as applied to an incarcerated population is a key line of inquiry. The Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency (PCCD) contracted The Institute on Crime, Justice and Corrections (ICJC) at The George Washington University to conduct a reliability and validation study using the LSI-R scores and recidivism data. The following report summarizes the ICJC’s findings. This project consists of two segments: an assessment of the inter-rater reliability in scoring the LSI-R, and the validation of the LSI-R’s statistical association with recidivism. The reliability assessment was conducted by selecting a sample of 120 prisoners who were scored on the LSI-R on two separate occasions by two independent PBPP institutional staff. The results of the initial reliability test showed that most of the LSI-R scoring items did not meet a sufficient level of reliability. Consequently, a second reliability test was made in September 2002 on another sample of 156 prisoners to determine if the reliability rates could be improved. The validation assessment entailed examining recidivists (for the purposes of this study, arrests, detentions, absconders, and returns to prison are considered recidivists) of approximately 1,000 prisoners who were released from nine LSI-R test facilities in 2001. For each of these prisoners an LSI-R form was completed. The follow-up period was for 12 months, which allowed the researchers to determine which items were associated with recidivism within that period. Details: Washington, DC: Institute on crime, Justice and Corrections at The George Washington University, 2003. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 9, 2010 at: www.portal.state.pa.us Year: 2003 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 120273 Keywords: ParolePredictionProbationRecidivismRisk AssessmentRisk Management |
Author: Zhang, Sheldon Title: COMPAS Validation Study: Final Report Summary: COMPAS (Correctional Offender Management and Profiling Alternative Sanctions) is a computerized database and analysis system designed to help criminal justice practitioners determine the placement, supervision, and case-management of offenders in community and secure settings. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation contracted with the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), and San Diego State University (SDSU) to validate the instrument in terms of its ability to identify treatment needs among inmates as well as predict various recidivism outcomes. A total of 91,334 parolees who had been assessed with COMPAS prior to release were included in the study sample. Of these, roughly 60,000 had been on parole for at least 12 months and the remainder had been on parole for at least 24 months. Characteristics of the study subjects closely paralleled those of the general parolee population in California. The COMPAS needs scales were evaluated in terms of their reliability over time (test-retest coefficients) and the extent to which their constituent scales correlated with relevant counterparts on the Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) scale (concurrent validity). To accomplish this, the COMPAS was administered twice to 75 inmates at the California Institute for Men (CIM) located in Chino, California, over a span of approximately two weeks. To establish concurrent validity, the LSI-R was also administered at the same time points. The COMPAS scales showed extremely high test-retest reliability, ranging from .70 to 1.00. The perfect and near-perfect correlations obtained for many of the scales appear to be driven by the fact that these scales were coded directly from the inmates’ Central Files. Overall, the average test-retest correlation coefficient for the COMPAS scales was .88. Of the 18 scales making up the core of the COMPAS assessment, nine appeared to measure identical or similar constructs with scales found in the LSI-R. For six of these scales (Criminal Involvement, Criminal Associates/Peers, Substance Abuse, Financial, Vocational/Educational, and Housing), significant and positive correlations were found between the COMPAS and LSI-R. The correlations were marginally significant for two of the scales, Family Criminality (COMPAS) with Family/Marital (LSI-R) and Criminal Attitudes (COMPAS) with Attitudes/Orientation (LSI-R), and not significant for one, Leisure (COMPAS) with Leisure/Recreation (LSI-R). Validation of Risk Scales Using official records data provided by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), two major outcome measures were examined: (1) any subsequent arrest, and (2) a subsequent arrest for a violent offense. For the first measure, the overall re-arrest rate for the COMPAS sample was 56% for the first 12 months on parole and 70% for those who had been released for two years. For violent offenses, the re-arrest rates were approximately 13% and 21% in the 12- and 24-month periods following release, respectively. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves were computed to assess the overall accuracy of the COMPAS risk scales for recidivism and violence. The ROC curve (measured in terms of the area under the curve or AUC) has become a primary measure of predictive accuracy in research instrumentation. A value of .70 is generally considered minimally acceptable. The recidivism and violence COMPAS risk scales were examined with regard to how well they predicted whether a parolee had been re-arrested (for any reason and for a violence offense) within two years of being released from prison. Both risk scales achieved levels of accuracy greater than chance, with the recidivism scale receiving an AUC value of .70, and the violence scale receiving an AUC value of .65. The risk prediction resulting from the COMPAS scales was comparable to our own risk prediction models using existing electronic records maintained by CDCR. We conclude that the COMPAS scales have high test-test retest reliability and moderate concordance with select LSI-R scales (with significant or marginally significant associations with eight of the nine scales that overlap with the LSI-R). With regard to the predictive validity of the recidivism and violence COMPAS risk scales, the general recidivism risk scale achieved an AUC value of .70, which is the conventional threshold for acceptability; the violence scale, however, fell short of this threshold. Details: Los Angeles: Semel Institute for Neuroscience and Human Behavior, University of California, Los Angeles, 2010. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 9, 2010 at: http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Adult_Research_Branch/Research_Documents/COMPAS_Final_Report_08-11-10.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Adult_Research_Branch/Research_Documents/COMPAS_Final_Report_08-11-10.pdf Shelf Number: 120274 Keywords: ParoleParoleesRisk AssessmentRisk Management |
Author: McNeill, Fergus Title: Research and Practice in Risk Assessment and Risk Management of Children and Young People Engaging in Offending Behaviours: A Literature Review Summary: This study has been undertaken with the main aim of providing an evaluation of the literature on research and practice in relation to the risk assessment and risk management of children and young people engaging in offending behaviours, to be used to inform the RMA’s future work in these fields. The study incorporates two aspects: a) a review of national and international literature on the practices and processes of risk assessment and risk management of children and young people who engage in offending behaviour, with particular reference to violent offending and sexually harmful behaviour, and b) a review of current practice in the assessment and management of children and young people at risk of harm and re-offending in Scotland, carried out by means of telephone interviews with academic researchers and practitioners working in statutory and voluntary sectors across Scotland. Details: Paisley, Scotland: Risk Management Authority Research, 2007. 107p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 17, 2011 at: http://rmascotland.org/ViewFile.aspx?id=327 Year: 2007 Country: International URL: http://rmascotland.org/ViewFile.aspx?id=327 Shelf Number: 120815 Keywords: Juvenile OffendersRisk AssessmentRisk Management |
Author: Wilson, Nick J. Title: New Zealand High-Risk Offenders: Who Are They and What Are the Issues in Their Management and Treatment? Summary: This exploratory study into who high risk offenders actually are, was an attempt to gain more information about offenders who are predicted to be at high risk of serious reoffending. While efforts to address criminogenic factors typically follow the risk/needs/responsivity principles established by Canadian researchers, little information outside of criminal history information and broad demographic details exists on what appears to be a diverse group of offenders. The very offender’s that are the primary management and treatment targets for the Corrections department, in reducing reoffending. The original study proposal also wanted to assess the impact on these offenders of Integrated Offender Management (IOM). As such it was hoped that the sample would have included the assessment procedures used in IOM to assess each individual offenders sentence plan (i.e., Criminal Needs Inventory). Unfortunately, the IOM processes were not carried out on sufficient numbers of the offenders involved in the study when interviews were carried out. It is hoped that funding for follow up of the study sample will occur at a later stage, enabling current IOM data to be included, as well as a more comprehensive understanding of the high risk offender group rather than simply a ‘snap-shot’. The Corrections Department primary risk assessment tool, the RoC*RoI measure was used to identify all inmates at New Zealand’s largest prison with risk scores over .70 (or 70% risk of serious recidivism). Approximately 28% of prison inmates in NZ have risk scores over this cut-off score used by parole authorities to classify high-risk offenders. A total of 150 prison inmates (79% of possible participants) consented to take part in the study that involved a two-hour session in which a number of psychometric instruments and a structured interview were administered. The interviews took place at Waikeria Prison in 2002. The study measures and the interview schedule included variables relating to personality, mental health, criminogenic needs, developmental history, cultural knowledge, treatment history and offence related information. It was hoped to provide descriptive information on the variables from these measures to assist in the development of intervention and management policies for high-risk offenders. In addition it was hoped to analyse the interaction between study variables to assist in the identification of possible causal links. This report presents the findings of this study. Details: Wellington, NZ: Department of Corrections, Psychological Service, 2004. 135p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2011 at: http://www.corrections.govt.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/177027/high-risk-offenders.pdf Year: 2004 Country: New Zealand URL: http://www.corrections.govt.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/177027/high-risk-offenders.pdf Shelf Number: 120847 Keywords: RecidivismRepeat Offenders (New Zealand)Risk Management |
Author: Hutto, John C. Title: Risk Management in Law Enforcement: A Model Assessment Tool Summary: The purpose of this research is threefold. The first purpose is to establish a practical ideal model to assess risk management practices in law enforcement agencies. Second, using case study, current risk management practices at the Austin Police Department will be assessed. The third purpose is to provide recommendations for improving the risk management practices at the Austin Police Department. A review of the literature has identified four key components of effective risk management programs. These components are program development, risk assessment, solution analysis, and program administration. The components of an effective risk management program identified in the literature are used to construct the conceptual framework. A practical ideal type model assessment tool for law enforcement agency risk management programs is created from the framework. The assessment tool is used in a case study of the Austin Police Department to gauge for the presence of an effective risk management program. The case study uses document analysis and survey research to perform the assessment. The Austin Police Department exists in a high-risk environment. Many of the policies and procedures the Department has in place are designed to mitigate or eliminate risk. The newly formed Risk Management Bureau of the Austin Police Department has been created to formalize many of the policies and procedures into a more comprehensive policy. At this time, the major shortcomings in the program are in the areas of training and communication. There has been limited training for the managers and administrators outside the Risk Management Bureau. Likewise, even though the Department is making progress towards a professional, innovative, risk management program, the communication to those in the organization about what is being done is lacking. Details: San Marcos, TX: Applied Research Projects, Texas State University - San Marcos, 2009. 137p. Source: Internet Resource: Paper 301: Accessed March 11, 2011 at: http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/301/ Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/301/ Shelf Number: 120969 Keywords: Police AdministrationPolicing (Austin, TX)Risk AssessmentRisk Management |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Bureau of Prisons: Evaluating the Impact of Protective Equipment Could Help Enhance Officer Safety Summary: The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) manages more than 209,000 inmates, up 45 percent between fiscal years 2000 and 2010. As the prison population grows, so do concerns about correctional officer safety. As requested, GAO examined the (1) equipment that BOP and selected state departments of corrections (DOC) provide to protect officers, and the officers' and other correctional practitioners' opinions of this equipment; (2) extent to which BOP has evaluated the effectiveness of this equipment, and factors correctional equipment experts consider important to the acquisition of new equipment; and (3) institutional factors correctional accrediting experts reported as impacting officer safety, and the extent to which BOP has evaluated the effectiveness of the steps it has taken in response. GAO reviewed BOP policies and procedures; interviewed BOP officials and officers within BOP's six regions, selected based on such factors as the level of facility overcrowding; interviewed officials at 14 of the 15 largest state DOCs; and surveyed 21 individuals selected for their expertise in corrections. The results of the interviews cannot be generalized, but provide insight into issues affecting officer safety. BOP and 14 state DOCs included in GAO's review provide a variety of protective equipment to officers, but BOP officers and management have different views on equipment. BOP generally provides officers with radios, body alarms, keys, flashlights, handcuffs, gloves, and stab-resistant vests while on duty, but prohibits them from storing personal firearms on BOP property, with limited exceptions. DOC officials in 14 states GAO interviewed provided examples of equipment they allow officers to carry while on duty that BOP does not--such as pepper spray--and officials in 9 of the 14 states reported allowing officers to store personal firearms on state DOC property. BOP and states provide similar equipment to protect officers in an emergency, such as an inmate riot or attack. Most BOP officers with whom GAO spoke reported that carrying additional equipment while on duty and commuting would better protect officers, while BOP management largely reported that officers did not need to carry additional equipment to better protect them. BOP has not evaluated the effectiveness of equipment it provides in ensuring officer safety, and correctional equipment experts report that BOP needs to consider a variety of factors in acquisition decisions. Neither the officials nor the experts with whom GAO spoke reported that they were aware of or had conducted evaluations of the effectiveness of equipment in ensuring officer safety, although BOP tracks information necessary to do so in its data systems. By using information in these existing systems, BOP could analyze the effectiveness of the equipment it distributes in ensuring officer safety, thus helping it determine additional actions, if any, to further officer safety and better target limited resources. All of the correctional equipment experts GAO spoke with reported that BOP would need to consider factors such as training, replacement, maintenance, and liability, as well as whether the equipment met performance standards, if it acquired new equipment. These experts suggested that any decision must first be based upon a close examination of the benefits and risk of using certain types of equipment. For example, while state officials reported that pepper spray is inexpensive and effective, a majority of the BOP management officials we spoke with stated that it could be taken by inmates and used against officers. Correctional accrediting experts most frequently cited control over the inmate population, officer training, inmate gangs, correctional staffing and inmate overcrowding as the institutional factors--beyond equipment--most impacting officer safety. These experts suggested various strategies to address these factors, and BOP reported taking steps to do so, such as conducting annual training on BOP policies, identifying and separating gang members, and converting community space into inmate cells. BOP has assessed the effectiveness of steps it has taken in improving officer safety. For instance, a 2001 BOP study found that inmates who participated in BOP's substance abuse treatment program were less likely than a comparison group to engage in misconduct for the remainder of their sentence following program completion. BOP utilizes such studies to inform its decisions, such as eliminating programs found to be ineffective. GAO recommends that BOP's Director assess whether the equipment intended to improve officer safety has been effective. BOP concurred with this recommendation Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-410: Accessed April 12, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11410.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11410.pdf Shelf Number: 121313 Keywords: Correctional FacilitiesCorrectional PersonnelCorrections OfficersPrisonsRisk AssessmentRisk ManagementWeapons |
Author: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Title: National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Partnering to Enhance Protection and Resiliency Summary: Protecting and ensuring the resiliency of the critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) of the United States is essential to the Nation’s security, public health and safety, economic vitality, and way of life. Attacks on CIKR could significantly disrupt the functioning of government and business alike and produce cascading effects far beyond the targeted sector and physical location of the incident. Direct terrorist attacks and natural, manmade, or technological hazards could produce catastrophic losses in terms of human casualties, property destruction, and economic effects, as well as profound damage to public morale and confidence. Attacks using components of the Nation’s CIKR as weapons of mass destruction could have even more devastating physical and psychological consequences. The NIPP provides the unifying structure for the integration of existing and future CIKR protection efforts and resiliency strategies into a single national program to achieve this goal. The NIPP framework supports the prioritization of protection and resiliency initiatives and investments across sectors to ensure that government and private sector resources are applied where they offer the most benefit for mitigating risk by lessening vulnerabilities, deterring threats, and minimizing the consequences of terrorist attacks and other manmade and natural disasters. The NIPP risk management framework recognizes and builds on existing public and private sector protective programs and resiliency strategies in order to be cost-effective and to minimize the burden on CIKR owners and operators. Protection includes actions to mitigate the overall risk to CIKR assets, systems, networks, functions, or their inter-connecting links. In the context of the NIPP, this includes actions to deter the threat, mitigate vulnerabilities, or minimize the consequences associated with a terrorist attack or other incident. Protection can include a wide range of activities, such as improving security protocols, hardening facilities, building resiliency and redundancy, incorporating hazard resistance into facility design, initiating active or passive countermeasures, installing security systems, leveraging “self-healing” technologies, promoting workforce surety programs, implementing cybersecurity measures, training and exercises, business continuity planning, and restoration and recovery actions, among various others. Achieving the NIPP goal requires actions to address a series of objectives, which include:• Understanding and sharing information about terrorist threats and other hazards with CIKR partners; • Building partnerships to share information and implement CIKR protection programs; • Implementing a long-term risk management program; and • Maximizing the efficient use of resources for CIKR protection, restoration, and recovery. These objectives require a collaborative partnership among CIKR partners, including: the Federal Government; State, local, tribal, and territorial governments; regional coalitions; the private sector; international entities; and nongovernmental organizations. The NIPP provides the framework that defines a set of flexible processes and mechanisms that these CIKR partners will use to develop and implement the national program to protect CIKR across all sectors over the long term. Details: Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2009. 188p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 16, 2011 at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf Shelf Number: 119210 Keywords: Risk AssessmentRisk ManagementSecurityTerrorismWeapons of Mass Destruction |
Author: Ekwall, Daniel Title: Managing the Risk for Antagonistic Threats against the Transport Network Summary: The World Trade Centre terror attack in 2001 changed the world and with it the conditions for logistics worldwide. The aftermath of the attack brought needed attention to the vulnerability of modern supply chains. This thesis addresses the antagonistic threats that exploit the vulnerability in a supply chain. Antagonistic threats are a limited array of risks and uncertainties and can be addressed with risk management tools and strategies. There are three key demarcations between antagonistic threats and other risks and uncertainties: deliberate (caused), illegal (defined by law), and hostile (negative impact, in this thesis, for transport network activities). This thesis makes a theoretical contribution to the usage of theories from criminology in supply chain risk management to handle antagonistic threats against the transport network. The recognition that antagonistic threats toward the transport network are a problem leads to verification of the research questions from the background and the theoretical framework. This is done to place or relate the research questions closer to the context. Furthermore, it leads to the conclusion that the answers may or may not contain competing and/or incompatible parts which differ depending on the perspective or viewpoint at the moment. One of the most important things to understand is that antagonistic threats toward freight always have been a feature in both business and politics. The different functions and goals for all stakeholders mean that all stakeholders and actors may use similar methods to manage antagonistic threats but the effects and consequences will change according to the circumstances. The system approach in this thesis is a soft-system thinking where reality is described in subjective terms and the whole system has the distinctive trait of vague or undefined boundaries between system components and the surrounding environment. Therefore, this thesis uses a complex system approach in which paradoxes and bounded rationality describes the system’s behaviour. This thesis defines the legal descriptions and criminal threats against and within supply chain management activities that entail both the systems context and boundaries. Managing of the antagonistic threats through the risk management perspective is separated into two sides, pre-event and post-event measures, which means the system needs to be robust and resilient, using logistics terms. It should be robust to automatically handle small risks (normally with high likelihood and low impact). The system also needs resilience in order to adapt, improvise, and overcome any disturbance greater than the system’s robustness can handle. Both robustness and its resilience can constitute of the full range of prevention, mitigation, and transferring tools and methods. Regardless of which perspective or viewpoint is chosen for analysing the problem, the same basic set of tools and methods are valid, but in practical use they need to be adapted to the actors’ needs and wants for managing their exposure to antagonistic threats. Details: Göteborg : Chalmers University of Technology, 2009. 286p. Source: Internet Resource: Doctoral Thesis: Accessed May 11, 2011 at: http://bada.hb.se/handle/2320/5033 Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://bada.hb.se/handle/2320/5033 Shelf Number: 121713 Keywords: Cargo TheftFreightRisk ManagementSupply Chain SecurityTransport Security |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Bureau of Prisons: Improved Evaluations and Increased Coordination Could Improve Cell Phone Detection Summary: BOP's rates for inmate telephone calls typically are lower than selected state and military branch systems that also use telephone revenues to support inmate activities; lowering rates would have several implications. Inmates would benefit from the ability to make cheaper phone calls, but lower rates could result in less revenue and lower profits, and therefore fewer funds available for inmate wages and recreational activities. According to BOP officials, when inmates have fewer opportunities for physical activity, idleness increases, and the risk of violence, escapes, and other disruptions also rises. BOP and selected states confiscated thousands of cell phones in 2010, and these entities believe that rising inmate cell phone use threatens institutional safety and expands criminal activity. All of the BOP officials, as well as officials from all eight of the state departments of correction with whom GAO spoke, cited cell phones as a major security concern, given the potential the phones provide for inmates to have unmonitored conversations that could further criminal activity, such as selling drugs or harassing other individuals. BOP and selected states have taken actions to address contraband cell phone use in their correctional institutions, but BOP could better evaluate existing technologies to maximize its investment decisions. BOP screens visitors and staff to detect contraband and has also tested multiple cell-phone detection technologies. However, BOP has not developed evaluation plans for institutional use to measure the effectiveness of these tests, which could help ensure that such tests generate information needed to make effective policy decisions. Moreover, while BOP has shared detection strategies with state agencies to some extent, BOP's regional offices have only had limited interaction with states, and could increase coordination and knowledge sharing to better identify and benefit from other strategies being used. This is a public version of a sensitive but unclassified - law enforcement sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2011. Information that the Department of Justice deemed sensitive has been omitted. GAO recommends that BOP's Director formulate evaluation plans for cell phone detection technology to aid decision making, require use of these plans, and enhance regional collaboration with states. The Department of Justice concurred with GAO's recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-893: Accessed September 7, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11893.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11893.pdf Shelf Number: 122673 Keywords: Cellular TelephonesCorrectional FacilitiesPrison ContrabandPrison SecurityPrisonersRisk ManagementSmuggling |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11 Summary: The events of September 11, 2001, led to profound changes in government policies and structures to confront homeland security threats. Most notably, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began operations in 2003 with key missions that included preventing terrorist attacks from occurring in the United States, and minimizing the damages from any attacks that may occur. DHS is now the third-largest federal department, with more than 200,000 employees and an annual budget of more than $50 billion. Since 2003, GAO has issued over 1,000 products on DHS's operations in such areas as border and transportation security and emergency management, among others. As requested, this report addresses DHS's progress in implementing its homeland security missions since it began operations, work remaining, and issues affecting implementation efforts. This report is based on GAO's past and ongoing work, supplemented with DHS Office of Inspector General reports, with an emphasis on reports issued since 2008. GAO also analyzed information provided by DHS in July and August 2011 on recent actions taken in response to prior work. Since it began operations in 2003, DHS has implemented key homeland security operations and achieved important goals and milestones in many areas to create and strengthen a foundation to reach its potential. As it continues to mature, however, more work remains for DHS to address gaps and weaknesses in its current operational and implementation efforts, and to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of those efforts to achieve its full potential. DHS's accomplishments include developing strategic and operational plans; deploying workforces; and establishing new, or expanding existing, offices and programs. For example, DHS (1) issued plans to guide its efforts, such as the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, which provides a framework for homeland security, and the National Response Framework, which outlines disaster response guiding principles; (2) successfully hired, trained, and deployed workforces, such as a federal screening workforce to assume security screening responsibilities at airports nationwide; and (3) created new programs and offices to implement its homeland security responsibilities, such as establishing the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team to help coordinate efforts to address cybersecurity threats. Such accomplishments are noteworthy given that DHS has had to work to transform itself into a fully functioning department while implementing its missions--a difficult undertaking that can take years to achieve. While DHS has made progress, its transformation remains high risk due to its management challenges. Examples of progress made and work remaining include: Border security. DHS implemented the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program to verify the identities of foreign visitors entering and exiting the country by processing biometric and biographic information. However, DHS has not yet determined how to implement a biometric exit capability and has taken action to address a small portion of the estimated overstay population in the United States (individuals who legally entered the country but then overstayed their authorized periods of admission). Aviation security. DHS developed and implemented Secure Flight, a program for screening airline passengers against terrorist watchlist records. DHS also developed new programs and technologies to screen passengers, checked baggage, and air cargo. However, DHS does not yet have a plan for deploying checked baggage screening technologies to meet recently enhanced explosive detection requirements, a mechanism to verify the accuracy of data to help ensure that air cargo screening is being conducted at reported levels, or approved technology to screen cargo once it is loaded onto a pallet or container. Emergency preparedness and response. DHS issued the National Preparedness Guidelines that describe a national framework for capabilities-based preparedness, and a Target Capabilities List to provide a national-level generic model of capabilities defining all-hazards preparedness. DHS is also finalizing a National Disaster Recovery Framework, and awards preparedness grants based on a reasonable risk methodology. However, DHS needs to strengthen its efforts to assess capabilities for all-hazards preparedness, and develop a long-term recovery structure to better align timing and involvement with state and local governments' capacity. Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. DHS assessed risks posed by CBRN threats and deployed capabilities to detect CBRN threats. However, DHS should work to improve its coordination of CBRN risk assessments, and identify monitoring mechanisms for determining progress made in implementing the global nuclear detection strategy. GAO's work identified three themes at the foundation of DHS's challenges. This report contains no new recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 225p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-881: Accessed September 12, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11881.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11881.pdf Shelf Number: 122718 Keywords: Aviation SecurityCounter-TerrorismCyber SecurityHomeland Security (U.S.)ImmigrationMaritime SecurityRisk ManagementTerrorismTransportation Security |
Author: Friedman, Allan Title: Economic and Policy Frameworks for Cybersecurity Risks Summary: Congress and the Obama administration have advanced dozens of proposals addressing cybersecurity. While many of these bills propose admirable policies, they often attempt to address a wide range of issues under a poorly matched set of frameworks. This paper offers three observations built around a framework of risk management to help focus the discussion. First, we caution against conflating different threats simply because they all involve information technology. Crime, espionage and international conflict are very different threats, and grouping them together can lead to poorly framed solutions. Second, we argue that looking at cybersecurity from the perspective of economics can offer important insight into identifying important policy opportunities. Finally, we suggest a series of governance frameworks that can be used in a complementary fashion to address many of the issues discussed. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Technology Innovation, Brookings, 2011. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 20, 2011 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2011/0721_cybersecurity_friedman/0721_cybersecurity_friedman.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2011/0721_cybersecurity_friedman/0721_cybersecurity_friedman.pdf Shelf Number: 122796 Keywords: Cybercrime (U.S.)CybersecurityRisk Management |
Author: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Title: Risk Management Fundamentals Homeland Security Risk Management Doctrine Summary: This doctrine, Risk Management Fundamentals, serves as an authoritative statement regarding the principles and process of homeland security risk management and what they mean to homeland security planning and execution. It is intended as the capstone doctrine on risk management for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Furthermore, Risk Management Fundamentals serves as a foundational document supporting DHS risk management efforts in partnership with the homeland security enterprise. Risk Management Fundamentals is intended to help homeland security leaders, supporting staffs, program managers, analysts, and operational personnel develop a framework to make risk management an integral part of planning, preparing, and executing organizational missions. The development of homeland security risk management doctrine is an essential element in promoting a risk-informed culture enabling training, capability development, and integration across DHS to strengthen and improve the Nation’s security. Risk Management Fundamentals articulates a desired end-state that DHS aspires to achieve in promoting risk management. This doctrine is not a substitute for independent thought or innovation in applying these principles and concepts. Simply reading the doctrine will not make one adept in managing risks, nor will attempting to follow the ideas herein as if they were a checklist; rather, doctrine serves to shape how one thinks about the issues that you are considering and should be applied based on the operating environment. Homeland security practitioners should compare the doctrine herein against their own experience and think about why, when, and how it applies to their situation and area of responsibility. The purpose of this document is to: Promote a common understanding of, and approach to, risk management; Establish organizational practices that should be followed by DHS Components; Provide a foundation for conducting risk assessments and evaluating risk management options; Set the doctrinal underpinning for institutionalizing a risk management culture through consistent application and training on risk management principles and practices; and Educate and inform homeland security stakeholders in risk management applications, including the assessment of capability, program, and operational performance, and the use of such assessments for resource and policy decisions. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 5, 2011 at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rma-risk-management-fundamentals.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rma-risk-management-fundamentals.pdf Shelf Number: 123245 Keywords: Homeland Security (U.S.)Risk AssessmentRisk ManagementTerrorism |
Author: Great Britain: HMI Probation Title: Thematic Inspection Report: Putting the Pieces Together An Inspection of Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements Summary: This inspection of the of the Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) was agreed by the Criminal Justice Chief Inspectors Group and formed part of the Joint Inspection Business Plan 2011-2013. It was led by HM Inspectorate of Probation, supported by HM Inspectorate of Constabulary. Its purpose was to assess the effectiveness of MAPPA in reducing the potential risk of harm to others presented by identified offenders in the community through joint working and the exchange of relevant information. We visited six areas and looked at a sample of cases managed through MAPPA. We examined the referral process and the plans to manage these offenders in the community drawn up at the MAPPA meetings. We then assessed the extent to which the agencies involved with the offenders took action and coordinated activity in response to the decisions made at the meetings. We also carried out a separate audit of the Violent and Sexual Offender Register (ViSOR), the database that contains information about most MAPPA eligible offenders. Overall findings -- The introduction of MAPPA placed, on a statutory basis, what previously had been a series of ad hoc arrangements for criminal justice agencies and other organisations to manage offenders deemed to present a risk of harm to others. It meant that staff in all agencies had, over time, to learn to share information and work collaboratively in order to assess and manage offenders who posed a risk of harm to the public. The subsequent development of MAPPA improved the assessment and management of these offenders. Despite the significant challenges in dealing with such individuals, the level of cooperation amongst criminal justice and other agencies, as shown by this inspection, was impressive. We found a culture of trust and openness in the agencies involved that encouraged the thoughtful exchange of information between staff working with the offenders. We also saw much good practice in the way in which staff tried to balance the needs of communities and victims with those of the offender. Given the nature of the offenders within MAPPA, it could be argued that all the cases should have been managed to the highest possible standard. Although, our findings were broadly positive, the inspection revealed a number of key areas for improvement which, in our opinion are crucial if MAPPA are to ensure that all reasonable action is taken to manage the risk of harm presented by an offender to others in the community. Lead Agency -- The national guidance, that sets out the way in which MAPPA are to operate, requires that a lead agency should be identified for each MAPPA eligible offender. We found that, despite this clear guidance, the concept of one agency taking the lead for an offender within MAPPA, whilst acknowledged by staff, was underdeveloped and did not impact on the way in which cases were managed. In practice, each agency involved with a case tended to act in isolation from one another other and used the MAPPA meetings mainly to update partners and exchange information. A clearer focus on a specified lead agency would promote a more coordinated approach to the management of each offender. Risk Management Planning -- We found that MAPPA rarely produced a comprehensive risk management plan. In accordance with the national guidance, MAPPA should agree a risk management plan for each offender subject to multi-agency management. We found that this very rarely happened in a comprehensive way. In some cases, a list of short-term actions was identified; in others, actions were too vague or simply not identified at all. We did not see any examples of a jointly agreed MAPPA risk management plan, specifying how all the relevant agencies would work together to manage the individual’s risk of harm to others, including contingency arrangements. Furthermore, actions for agencies identified by MAPPA were not always well integrated into the records of the relevant agency. Most of the cases we saw were managed through a range of restrictive interventions, including curfews, approved premises, exclusion zones and surveillance. There was little question that these interventions were necessary, but they needed to be balanced by a focus on protective factors such as involvement in positive activities and constructive interventions designed to reduce the level of risk presented by the offender in the longer term. Offender managers and MAPPA as a whole paid little attention to what would happen to the offender at the end of supervision. Active Management -- Emphasis was too often placed on information exchange within MAPPA, rather than on the active management of an offender. MAPPA meetings to review and plan work with offenders were well attended and held at the right frequency. The chairs of the meetings worked hard to ensure that all the participants were able to make a contribution. However, in many meetings, the emphasis was more on the exchange of information between agencies rather than on the development of strategies actively to manage the risk of harm presented by the offender. As a result, the chair did not always hold agencies sufficiently to account for their actions. In order to do this, chairs of meetings not only needed to be knowledgable about process and procedures, they also needed to be assertive and have well developed skills in chairing and managing meetings. Documentation Minutes of MAPPA meetings were often not fit for purpose. Minutes recording the details of MAPPA meetings were generally poorly written and presented. In many instances, there were delays in distribution and we found numerous examples of minutes that contained out of date information, or information that was wrong. Some were lengthy and difficult to read because discussions had been transcribed verbatim. In one area, the minutes contained pages of action points, whilst in others, there were almost none. As a result, the minutes were rarely used as a working tool and staff tended to develop their own recording systems. The poor quality of the minutes meant that the agencies within MAPPA would not always be able demonstrate that they had made defensible decisions in the event of a challenge. ViSOR -- We also undertook a detailed audit of the ViSOR records held on the offenders in the inspection sample. Our findings were disappointing. We found that ViSOR was not used as a shared working tool by police and probation staff, mainly because, whilst ViSOR was reasonably accessable to police staff, access by probation staff was severly constrained. In addition, the quality of the information held on the system was not always of a high standard. Conclusion -- In order to work well, all the participants in MAPPA need to work together to develop a shared view about the nature of the risk presented by an individual offender to the public, draw up a plan to manage that risk and then ensure that the plan is implemented, reviewed and updated in response to events. In this report, we identify a number of areas where these elements of MAPPA work can be improved and we make a range of recommendations to address these findings. Details: London: Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2011. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 19, 2011 at: http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/inspectorate-reports/hmiprob/mappa-thematic-report.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/inspectorate-reports/hmiprob/mappa-thematic-report.pdf Shelf Number: 123404 Keywords: Agency Collaboration (U.K.)Community Based CorrectionsOffender SupervisionPartnershipsProbationRisk Management |
Author: Home Office Title: Local to Global: Reducing the Risk from Organised Crime Summary: Organised crime is a real problem that affects real people. Organised crime costs the UK between £20 and £40 billion every year – its impact is felt by the state, businesses, communities, families and individuals. On 28 July 2011, the government launched its new organised crime strategy, 'Local to global: reducing the risk from organised crime'. Through the strategy, the government has set out clear proposals for bringing together for the first time the work of those in the UK with a responsibility for tackling organised crime. On 8 June the government published its plan for the creation of a new National Crime Agency (NCA). When established, in 2013, the NCA will result in a step change in fighting organised crime, by creating the right structure at a national level to combat this threat. 'Local to global' outlines how we will oversee improvements before the establishment of the NCA, and through to 2015, and how the work of the police service, the Serious Organised Crime Agency, HM Revenue & Customs, the UK Border Agency and the intelligence agencies will become increasingly coordinated, more effective and more efficient. The overall aim of the organised crime strategy is to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests from organised crime by reducing the threat from organised criminals and reducing vulnerabilities and criminal opportunities. The key elements of our response are based on three themes: stem the opportunities for organised crime to take root strengthen enforcement against organised criminals safeguard communities, businesses and the state. The strategy also sets out how the public has a key part to play and how communities will be supported to play a greater role in ensuring that organised criminals cannot keep themselves, and their criminal assets, out of the reach of law enforcement. Taken together, the new approach and actions set out in this strategy will enable us collectively to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests from organised crime. Accountability and implementation: We will also put in place clear accountability arrangements and a transparent set of indicators so the public can judge success. Overall implementation of the organised crime strategy will be overseen by the National Security Council with implementation coordinated by the strategic centre for organised crime in the Home Office. Details: London: Home Office, 2011. 44. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 23, 2012 at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/crime/organised-crime-strategy?view=Binary Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/crime/organised-crime-strategy?view=Binary Shelf Number: 123757 Keywords: Organized Crime (U.K.)Risk Management |
Author: Barnes, Geoffrey C. Title: Classifying Adult Probationers by Forecasting Future Offending Summary: Random forest modeling techniques represent an improvement over the methodologies of traditional risk prediction instruments. Random forests allow for the inclusion of a large number of predictors, the use of a variety of different data sources, the expansion of assessments beyond binary outcomes, and taking the costs of different types of forecasting errors into account when constructing a new model. This study explores the application of random forest statistical learning techniques to a criminal risk forecasting system, which is now used to classify adult probationers by the level of risk they pose to the community. The project principally focused upon creating a risk prediction tool within a partnership between University-based researchers and Philadelphia’s Adult Probation and Parole Department (APPD). This report details the model building process, including an explanation of the random forest procedures, and sets out the issues in data management and in policy considerations that are associated with creating a prediction tool. The importance of developing strong researcher-practitioner partnerships, especially with regard to tailoring the prediction tool to real-world concerns, is also considered. The prediction models developed as a part of this project have been used since 2009 to assess all incoming probation and parole cases. Each risk prediction is then used to assign offenders to risk-stratified supervision divisions. This report discusses the development and accuracy of the three generations of models that have been employed to make these predictions, as well as the salient features of each iteration. For the most recent version of the model, the influences of major predictor variables are discussed, with a focus on those that were most powerful in the Philadelphia sample. Additionally, the predictions of the three models are also validated using a sample of cases from 2001, a cohort not used to build any of the prediction models. The long-term offending patterns of these 2001 offenders, with regard to their assessed risk level, are also considered. Finally, suggestions and step-by-step instructions are offered for practitioners seeking to build a similar prediction instrument for use in a wide variety of criminal justice settings. As a matter of policy, criminal sanctions that are encompassed under the umbrella of community corrections have become an increasingly prevalent punishment option. Given resource constraints, as well as concerns about public safety, statistical risk assessment tools – such as the one developed here – have begun to take increasingly prominent roles in determining levels of supervision. This report, and the partnership supporting it, highlights the promises and potential of the methodology. Details: Report to the U.S. National Institute of Justice, 2012. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 27, 2012 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238082.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238082.pdf Shelf Number: 125408 Keywords: Offender Classification (Pennsylvania)ProbationersRecidivismRisk Management |
Author: Jennings, Will Title: Tools of Security Risk Management for the London 2012 Olympic Games and FIFA 2006 World Cup in Germany Summary: Mega-events such as the Olympic Games and the football World Cup represent a special venue for the practice of risk management. This paper explores management of security risks in the case of two sporting mega-events, the London 2012 Olympic Games and the FIFA 2006 World Cup in Germany. The analysis progresses in three stages. First, it explores three explanations that have dominated the literature on policy instruments and tools and introduces the generic tools of government approach developed by Christopher Hood (1983). Second, it reviews the tools used for security risk management at the two mega-events. Third, it evaluates competing explanations of tool choice and degree to which these are consistent with organisational strategies of risk management at the events. The findings highlight the importance of national political systems in influencing tool choice. Details: London: Centre fo Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics, 2009. 27p. Source: CARR Discussion Paper No. 55: Internet Resource: Accessed August 13, 2012 at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/36539/1/Disspaper55.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/36539/1/Disspaper55.pdf Shelf Number: 126012 Keywords: Event PlanningRisk ManagementSporting Events |
Author: Randazzo, Marisa Reddy Title: Insider Threat Study: Illicit Cyber Activity in the Banking and Finance Sector Summary: Current and former employees, contractors, and other organizational “insiders” pose a substantial threat by virtue of their knowledge of and access to their employers’ systems and/or databases and their ability to bypass existing physical and electronic security measures through legitimate means. Previous efforts to study insider incidents have focused on convenience samples and narrow areas of industry and have not examined the incidents from both behavioral and technical perspectives simultaneously. These gaps in the literature have made it difficult for organizations to develop a comprehensive understanding of the insider threat and address the issue from an approach that draws on human resources, corporate security, and information security perspectives. The Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center and the CERT Coordination Center of Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute joined efforts to conduct a unique study of insider incidents, the Insider Threat Study (ITS), examining actual cases identified through public reporting or as a computer fraud case investigated by the Secret Service. Each case was analyzed from a behavioral and a technical perspective to identify behaviors and communications in which the insiders engaged—both online and offline—prior to and including the insiders’ harmful activities. Section 1 of this report presents an overview of the ITS, including its background, scope, and study methods. Section 2 reports the findings and implications specific to research conducted on insider threat cases in the banking and finance sector. Details: Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University, Software Engineering Institute, 2005. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 7, 2012 at http://www.sei.cmu.edu/reports/04tr021.pdf Year: 2005 Country: United States URL: http://www.sei.cmu.edu/reports/04tr021.pdf Shelf Number: 126569 Keywords: Corporate CrimeCybercrimeFinancial FraudInsider ThreatsRisk Management |
Author: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General Title: Supervision of Aliens Commensurate with Risk Summary: This report addresses the effectiveness of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s decisionmaking process on whether to detain aliens in an Immigration and Customs Enforcement facility or place them in supervised release. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a review of applicable documents. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s mission is to protect the security of the American people by enforcing the nation’s immigration and customs laws. This includes the identification, apprehension, detention, and removal of deportable aliens from the United States. Aliens undergoing removal proceedings are either held in an Immigration and Customs Enforcement detention facility or placed in one of five supervised release options. On September 30, 2009, 31,306 aliens were in detention facilities, an estimated 153,000 were incarcerated in federal prisons or state and local jails, and 1.5 million were released through a variety of supervision options. Our audit objective was to assess the effectiveness of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s decisionmaking process on whether to detain aliens in an Immigration and Customs Enforcement facility or place them in supervised release. Immigration and Customs Enforcement generally has an effectively designed decisionmaking process for determining whether to detain or release aliens. In most of the cases we assessed, officers made reasonable decisions and complied with requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Supreme Court decisions, and prescribed policies and procedures. However, personnel could not always provide evidence that all aliens were screened against the Terrorist Watchlist; current policy for screening aliens from specially designated countries is not effective; and personnel did not always maintain accurate and up-to-date information in the case management system. The agency has taken action to correct deficiencies in its data quality. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials concurred with two of our three recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, 2011. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 13, 2013 at http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-81_Dec11.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-81_Dec11.pdf Shelf Number: 127268 Keywords: Immigrant DetentionRisk ManagementSupervised Release |
Author: Zgoba, Kristen M. Title: A Multi-State Recidivism Study Using Static-99R and Static-2002 Risk Scores and Tier Guidelines from the Adam Walsh Act Summary: This study seeks to examine important components of our nation’s sex offender tracking and monitoring systems, with a focus on risk assessment and sexual recidivism (measured by re-arrest). The principal aims of this study were fourfold: (1) to compare the nationally recommended Adam Walsh Act (AWA) classification tiers with actuarial risk assessment instruments in their respective abilities to identify high risk individuals and recidivists; (2) to evaluate the predictive accuracy of existing state risk assessment classification schemes; (3) to examine the distribution of risk assessment scores within and across tier categories as defined by the AWA; and (4) to examine the role of offender age in recidivism risk across the adult lifespan. Data were collected from 1,789 adult sex offenders in four states (Minnesota, New Jersey, Florida and South Carolina) to inform these analyses. Variables including offender demographics and criminal history information, coded from state criminal justice records, were used to score actuarial risk assessment instruments and sex offender registry information. On average, we found that the recidivism rate was approximately 5% at five years and 10% at 10 years. AWA tier was unrelated to sexual recidivism, except in Florida, where it was inversely associated with recidivism. Actuarial measures and existing state tiering systems both showed better predictive validity than AWA tiers. Finally, offender age was found to have a significant protective effect for sexual reoffending, with older offenders showing a decreased risk for sexual recidivism. The findings indicate that the current AWA classification scheme is likely to result in a system that is less effective in protecting the public than the classification systems currently implemented in the states studied. Policy makers should strongly consider substantial revisions of the AWA classification system to better incorporate evidence-based models of sex offender risk assessment and management. Details: Final Report submitted to the U.S. National Institute of Justice, 2012. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 16, 2013 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/240099.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/240099.pdf Shelf Number: 127640 Keywords: Adam Walsh ActRecidivismRisk AssessmentRisk ManagementSex Offenders (U.S.) |
Author: Clemente, Dave Title: Epub: Cyber Security and Global Interdependence: What Is Critical? Summary: The evolution of interconnection between infrastructure sectors has been accelerated by the spread of cyberspace, which has become the 'nervous system' linking them. There is no avoiding the security implications emerging at the intersection of cyberspace and infrastructure. As countries become more dependent on infrastructure distributed around the world, the growing complexity of interconnections makes it harder for authorities to identify what infrastructure is 'critical'. Improving risk management relies on using rigorous definitions of what infrastructure is 'critical', which enables more effective prioritization and protection of nodes and connection points. In this context, the ever-rising importance of data makes distinctions between 'physical' and 'information' infrastructure increasingly irrelevant. Societal resilience can be just as important as infrastructure resilience, and policy-makers should consider closely what levels of societal dependency on digital technologies are appropriate. Building public confidence in the security and governance of the critical infrastructure ecosystem is essential to avoid policy-making driven by reactive or narrow interests. Meeting these security challenges requires better shared understanding of what is critical between those who protect an organization and those who set its strategic direction. Better understanding of the economic and political incentives that guide stakeholders also reveals the scope for potential cooperation. Details: London: Chatham House, 2013. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 7, 2013 at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/189679 Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/189679 Shelf Number: 127867 Keywords: Cyber SecurityCybercrimesInfrastructure ProtectionInternet CrimesRisk Management |
Author: Ponemon Institute LLC Title: Managing Cyber Security as a Business Risk: Cyber Insurance in the Digital Age Summary: With the increasing cost and volume of data breaches, cyber security is quickly moving from being considered by business leaders as a purely technical issue to a larger business risk. This shift has spurred increased interest in cyber insurance to mitigate the cost of these issues. In a new study sponsored by Experian® Data Breach Resolution, Ponemon Institute surveyed risk management professionals across multiple sectors that have considered or adopted cyber insurance. Based on responses, many understand that security is a clear and present risk. Indeed a majority of companies now rank cyber security risks as greater than natural disasters and other major business risks. Details: Ponemon Institute, 2013. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 19, 2013 at: http://www.experian.com/innovation/business-resources/ponemon-study-managing-cyber-security-as-business-risk.jsp?ecd_dbres_cyber_insurance_study_ponemon_referral Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.experian.com/innovation/business-resources/ponemon-study-managing-cyber-security-as-business-risk.jsp?ecd_dbres_cyber_insurance_study_ponemon_referral Shelf Number: 129646 Keywords: Crimes Against BusinessesCyber-SecurityCybercrime (International)Internet CrimeRisk Management |
Author: Seghetti, Lisa Title: Border Security: Immigration Inspections at Port of Entry Summary: About 362 million travelers (citizens and non-citizens) entered the United States in FY2013, including about 102 million air passengers and crew, 18 million sea passengers and crew, and 242 million incoming land travelers. At the same time about 205,000 aliens were denied admission at ports of entry (POEs); and about 24,000 persons were arrested at POEs on criminal warrants. (Not all persons arrested are denied admission, including because some are U.S. citizens.) Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Office of Field Operations (OFO) is responsible for conducting immigration inspections at America's 329 POEs. CBP's primary immigration enforcement mission at ports of entry is to confirm that travelers are eligible to enter the United States and to exclude inadmissible aliens. Yet strict enforcement is in tension with a second core mission: to facilitate the flow of lawful travelers, who are the vast majority of persons seeking admission. A fundamental question for Congress and DHS is how to balance these competing concerns. In general, DHS and CBP rely on "risk management" to strike this balance. One part of the risk management strategy is to conduct screening at multiple points in the immigration process, beginning well before travelers arrive at U.S. POEs. DHS and other departments involved in the inspections process use a number of screening tools to distinguish between known, low-risk travelers and lesser-known, higher-risk travelers. Low-risk travelers may be eligible for expedited admissions processing, while higher-risk travelers are usually subject to more extensive secondary inspections. As part of its dual mission, and in support of its broader mandate to manage the U.S. immigration system, DHS also is responsible for implementing an electronic entry-exit system at POEs. Congress required DHS' predecessor to develop an entry-exit system beginning in 1996, but the implementation of a fully automated, biometric system has proven to be an elusive goal. The current system collects and stores biographic entry data (e.g., name, date of birth, travel history) from almost all non-citizens entering the United States, but only collects biometric data (e.g., fingerprints and digital photographs) from non-citizens entering at air or seaports, and from a subset of land travelers that excludes most Mexican and Canadian visitors. With respect to exit data, the current system relies on information sharing agreements with air and sea carriers and with Canada to collect biographic data from air and sea travelers and from certain non-citizens exiting through northern border land ports; but the system does not collect data from persons exiting by southern border land ports and does not collect any biometric exit data. Questions also have been raised about DHS' ability to use existing entry-exit data to identify and apprehend visa over-stayers. The inspections process and entry-exit system may raise a number of questions for Congress, including in the context of the ongoing debate about immigration reform. What is the scope of illegal migration through ports of entry, and how can Congress and DHS minimize illegal flows without unduly slowing legal travel? Congress may consider steps to enhance POE personnel and infrastructure and to expand trusted travel programs. Congress also may continue to seek the completion of the entry-exit system, a program that has been the subject of ongoing legislative activity since 1996, as summarized in the appendix to this report. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: R43356: Accessed July 31, 2014 at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43356.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43356.pdf Shelf Number: 132857 Keywords: Border Security (U.S.)Homeland SecurityIllegal ImmigrationImmigrationImmigration EnforcementRisk ManagementUndocumented Immigrants |
Author: Irvin-Erickson, Yasemin Title: Identifying Risky Places for Crime: An Analysis of the Criminogenic Spatiotemporal Influences of Landscape Features on Street Robberies Summary: In environmental criminology, it is widely accepted that crime risk is affected by the legitimate and illegitimate activities hosted at places. Most studies exploring this influence use the concepts of environmental criminology to explain how landscape features (such as cash businesses, illegal markets) can promote criminal behavior. However, studies based on place-based indicators provide an incomplete picture of crime emergence. First, most studies assume a temporally uniform crime-generating influence of landscape features, ignoring the social relevancy of these features at different times. Second, in most crime and place studies, the spatial influence - the ways in which features of a landscape affect places throughout the landscape (Caplan, 2011, p. 57) - is operationalized arbitrarily (Ratcliffe, 2012). Moreover, few studies examine the interactivity of the criminogenic spatial influences of different landscape features on crime risk (Caplan et al., 2011). To address these limitations, this dissertation examined the individual and combined criminogenic spatiotemporal influences of landscape features on 2010 street robbery risk in the City of Newark, NJ, using the principles of Risk Terrain Modeling. Street robberies were classified into six daily and hourly temporal groups. According to the results of this dissertation, criminogenic features are different for different time models, and the extent and weight of their criminogenic influences vary between and within time nested models. At-risk housing, schools, churches, grocery stores, hair and nail salons, pawn shops, sit-down restaurants, and take-out restaurants are the only features that have round-the clock criminogenic influences on street robberies in all time models. Drug charges, pawn shops, grocery stores, take-out restaurants, and hair and nail salons exert the strongest criminogenic spatial influences in different time models. At-risk housing's, schools', and churches' criminogenic influences are statistically significant, albeit weak. High-risk micro places identified by the combined criminogenic spatiotemporal influences of landscape features are high likely places for street robberies in Newark, NJ. Details: Newark, NJ: Rutgers University, School of Criminal Justice, 2014. 161p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed April 1, 2015 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248636.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248636.pdf Shelf Number: 135114 Keywords: Crime AnalysisCrime PlacesEnvironmental CriminologyRisk ManagementSpatial AnalysisStreet Robbery |
Author: Eisenhauer, Simone Title: Managing event places and viewer spaces: Security, surveillance and stakeholder interests at the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa Summary: This thesis explores the security risk management and commercial organisation of public urban spaces at the 2010 FIFA World Cup (FWC) in South Africa. Extending knowledge of how commercial interests intersect with security risk management of public urban spaces at sport mega-events, this study examines these concepts in a developing world context. Using a neoliberal theoretical lens and drawing on the concepts of Festivalisation and Disneyisation, the research contributes to academic scholarship in the areas of both sport and event management. This is achieved through a critical examination of security and commercialisation strategies in 'public spaces' at a sport mega-event, namely, public viewing areas (PVAs) and commercial restricted zones (CRZs). The research problem was investigated by means of an inductive interpretive qualitative case study approach. The selected event was the 2010 FWC, and within this event an indepth case study of Cape Town was selected for examination. Multiple sources of evidence included government, management, and media documentation. In addition, semi-structured interviews were drawn upon to generate a narrative of the roles and interests of three key stakeholders (the event owner, event sponsor and event host) in the process of strategically managing PVAs and CRZs. The government's policies, decisions, and actions associated with staging of the 2010 FWC reflected new and exemplary forms of neoliberal urban governance in concert with intensified levels of policing and securitisation. The measures taken to combat ambush marketing were of particular note. FIFA's requirements on the host city facilitated decisions about public and private spaces that redefined public policies and rules. Intensification of spatial and social fragmentation and greater exclusion resulted; in other words, the evidence demonstrates the phenomenon of the 'FIFA-isation' of public space. Rhetoric from event owners and city authorities on the benefits of hosting the FWC claimed intended outcomes, which were the exact opposite of what eventuated. Details: Sydney: University of Technology, Sydney: 2013. 364p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed September 18, 2015 at: https://opus.lib.uts.edu.au/research/bitstream/handle/10453/23538/02whole.pdf?sequence=5 Year: 2013 Country: South Africa URL: https://opus.lib.uts.edu.au/research/bitstream/handle/10453/23538/02whole.pdf?sequence=5 Shelf Number: 136811 Keywords: Public SafetyPublic SpacesRisk ManagementSecuritySporting EventsWorld Cup |
Author: Jennings, Will Title: Mega-Events and Risk Colonisation: Risk Management and the Olympics Summary: This paper uses the idea of risk colonisation (Rothstein et al. 2006) to analyse how societal and institutional risks simultaneously make mega-events such as the Olympics a problematic site for risk management while contributing to the spread of the logic and formal managerial practice of risk management. It outlines how mega-events are linked to broader societal and institutional hazards and threats but at the same time induce their own unique set of organizational pathologies and biases. In this context, it is argued that the combination of societal and institutional risks create pressure for safety and security which in turn give rise to the growing influence of risk as an object of planning, operations and communication both in organisation of the Games and governance of the Olympic movement. This is consistent with the colonizing influence of risk over time: both in the creation of formal institutions (such as risk management teams and divisions) and the proliferation of the language of 'risk' as an object of regulation and control. Details: London: Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2012. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Discussion Paper No. 71: Accessed October 8, 2015 at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/accounting/CARR/pdf/DPs/Disspaper71.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.lse.ac.uk/accounting/CARR/pdf/DPs/Disspaper71.pdf Shelf Number: 136978 Keywords: Event PlanningOlympicsRisk ManagementSecuritySports |
Author: Robertson, Doone Title: Tourism Risk Management: An Authoritative Guide to Managing Crises in Tourism Summary: The purpose of this guide is to provide tourism industry members in Asia, the Pacific and beyond with an authoritative guide to risk management. Importantly, the generic risk management process has been adapted to the specific needs of tourism. The guide provides a practical framework within which tourism destinations can identify, analyse, evaluate, treat, monitor and review risks in the tourism context. Although the tourism risk management process has been developed for destinations, the same principles also apply to a tourism business or organization and can easily be adapted for their purposes. Throughout this guide there are two fundamental roles for tourism in risk management: the first of these is as a partner with government and community agencies in the development of multi-agency, coordinated disaster management plans, systems, procedures and processes which include the needs of tourism; the second is to develop plans and procedures appropriate to a destination and to the specific roles and responsibilities of an organization, to train personnel to those plans, and to conduct regular tests of plans, procedures and personnel with subsequent amendment and update. Although the tourism industry is not responsible for the development or implementation of community disaster management plans and arrangements, the guide recommends that destinations and tourism operators should, when possible, participate in disaster planning and management activities through appropriate local, regional or national committees. Such participation enables the importance of tourism to be drawn to the attention of disaster management agencies and promotes the need for appropriate measures to be established to protect visitors in times of crisis. Case studies of Hurricane Katrina and the Bali Bombings demonstrate how a community disaster can affect confidence in tourism and interfere with its ability to continue normal operations. While each tourist destination is unique and will have different issues to deal with, there are key areas of risk management which are common across destinations. The most obvious is a dramatic drop in visitor numbers in which the impact is felt across a whole economy. While this guide presents case studies of recent events which have had a significant impact on tourism, the focus is on solutions rather than merely documenting past difficulties. The guide also provides checklists which will assist destinations and tourism businesses to adopt current risk management processes. This guide draws on best practice from a range of sources within and outside the APEC group. Current knowledge and practical application are the objectives of the project, so that peak bodies (UNWTO, PATA, etc) can use material from this report for training and education programs. Recognizing the critical role of national governments in supporting and protecting tourist destinations, the guide also seeks to offer an authoritative guide that can be endorsed by governments. Details: Singapore: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 2006. 98p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 19, 2015 at: http://earthcheck.org/media/7635/tourism-risk-management.pdf Year: 2006 Country: International URL: http://earthcheck.org/media/7635/tourism-risk-management.pdf Shelf Number: 137007 Keywords: Crisis Management Risk ManagementTourism Tourists |
Author: Gulliver, Pauline Title: Risk assessment: What is it and how can it be applied in family violence? Summary: Key messages Risk assessment must be considered as a piece in the wider puzzle of risk management. Adequate services need to be provided for those considered at less risk, so they receive an appropriate response. This also reduces the imperative for service providers to escalate a case, in order to get help for a person. Effective risk assessment and management needs to be grounded in an integrated response system. This needs to have: - Underlying principles which shape how practitioners respond. - Training for practitioners in the effective conduct of risk assessment and the effective communication of results. - Appropriate risk assessment tools should be selected, with monitoring to ensure they are used as intended and that they support risk management decision making. - Clarity of roles and responsibilities for all components of the system. Co-location of professionals for risk management appears very beneficial to facilitate adequate communication. Co-location: - Enhances the development of a unique culture which supports increased trust and information sharing between professionals from different agencies. - Facilitates the process of risk management planning by reducing turnaround times and enhancing access to services. - Where effective colocation is not achievable, clear roles, responsibilities, communication strategies and a common culture around family violence must be developed to ensure a consistent response is provided. Effective communication of risk, using common language, is vital to ensure all professionals understand how an estimation of risk was derived. - Training is required across government agencies to ensure there is a consistent understanding of family violence - including understanding definitions and patterns of violence. - To develop a common language, training should be shared across government agencies, rather than being delivered within agencies. Effective risk management requires a lead agency to take responsibility for the implementation of planned activities. This lead agency also needs to be tasked with the responsibility of regularly reviewing risk in light of developments. - Agencies need to be aware of each others roles and responsibilities within the risk management system. - Where limitations exist within the family violence risk management system, external resourcing may be required to ensure all risks are effectively addressed. Details: Auckland, NZ: New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse, 2015. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Issues Paper 9: Accessed November 5, 2015 at: https://nzfvc.org.nz/sites/nzfvc.org.nz/files/issues-paper-9-risk-assessment.pdf Year: 2015 Country: New Zealand URL: https://nzfvc.org.nz/sites/nzfvc.org.nz/files/issues-paper-9-risk-assessment.pdf Shelf Number: 137198 Keywords: Child Abuse and NeglectDomestic ViolenceFamily Violence (New Zealand)Intimate Partner ViolenceRisk ManagementViolence Against Women |
Author: Gulliver, Pauline Title: Understanding research on risk and protective factors for intimate partner violence Summary: Key messages - Conceptual models guide the exploration of risk and protective factors. - Conceptual models help us to organise our thoughts and identify relationships between the different risk and protective factors for intimate partner violence, and other forms of violence. - Some conceptual models (such as the ecological model) have helped to expand our understanding of the wider societal and community factors that impact on violence experience. - Consistent findings at the international level have allowed the identification of a common set of factors that are strongly associated with violence experience, but these are not the only factors that influence the likelihood of violence occurring. - There are some challenges involved with measuring some risk or protective factors - Most of the research identifying risk and protective factors for intimate partner violence collect information at only one point in time. The result is that it is difficult to establish whether factors that are related to violence experience caused the violence or are a result of experiencing the violence (or both). - While, the use of controlling behaviours is strongly associated with violence experience, behaviours can mean different things to different people. It is important to understand the context of an abuser's behaviour in order to fully understanding the meaning. - There is no "one true cause" of intimate partner violence. - Violence is typically the outcome of the interaction of many different factors. - Individual, relationship, community, social and cultural factors work together to enhance or reduce the likelihood of violence being perpetrated or experienced. - Violence is a behaviour which is governed by choice. Decisions and subsequent actions are influenced by societal attitudes about what is considered acceptable behaviour. - A comprehensive, multi-pronged approach is required to address intimate partner violence as well as other forms of family violence in New Zealand. - Lessons can be learned from systematic approaches to addressing other problem behaviour patterns. For example, addressing the road toll required: - Investment in infrastructure - Legislation to reduce risk - Social marketing campaigns - Improvements in safety design - Swift and sure punishment where laws were broken - Increased resourcing at high risk periods - Consistent and adequate funding over a sustained period of time - To optimise the likelihood of success a long-term investment in policy, infrastructure and communities is required. This needs to be supported by an overall strategic government framework for addressing IPV. Details: Auckland, NZ: New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse, 2016. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Issues Paper 10: Accessed June 11, 2016 at: https://nzfvc.org.nz/sites/nzfvc.org.nz/files/NZFVC-issues-paper-10.pdf Year: 2016 Country: New Zealand URL: https://nzfvc.org.nz/sites/nzfvc.org.nz/files/NZFVC-issues-paper-10.pdf Shelf Number: 139397 Keywords: Domestic Violence Family Violence (New Zealand) Intimate Partner Violence Risk ManagementViolence Against Women |
Author: Hanby, Laura J. Title: A Longitudinal Study of Dynamic Risk, Protective Factors, and Criminal Recidivism: Change Over Time and the Impact of Assessment Timing Summary: Risk assessment and risk management are central to most decisions made about offenders, particularly when considering community release after a period of incarceration. Although the field of risk assessment has progressed considerably, there remain limitations within current practices. The present research uses a variety of sophisticated statistical techniques to examine the systematic assessment and reassessments of risk in a large sample (N = 3498) of New Zealand parolees. The validity of the Dynamic Risk Assessment for Offender Re-entry (DRAOR), a measure of dynamic risk and protective factors, was assessed across time in all offenders released on parole. The measure demonstrated acceptable psychometric properties, although future research should seek to refine the subscales as suggested by its factor structure. Beyond validating the DRAOR, this study showed that reconvictions and criminal reconvictions during a two-year follow-up period can be accurately predicted from dynamic risk factors and protective factors (as measured by the DRAOR). Stable and acute dynamic risk scores decreased over time while protective factor scores increased, suggesting that the DRAOR is sensitive to change. Recidivists differed from non-recidivists in stable dynamic risk and protective factors in the month prior to follow-up end and in acute dynamic risk in the second month prior to follow-up end. Reconvictions were accurately predicted from monthly average Stable Risk beginning at parole start and continuing for 12 months of assessments, while Protective Factors were predictive for the first 4 months only. These results indicate that the DRAOR has promise as a valid tool for risk assessment and risk management. The findings of this study highlight the mechanisms by which risk changes over time and provides support for a transitional model of offender re-entry focusing on dynamic risk and protective factors. Details: Ottawa: Carleton University, 2013. 225p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed July 11, 2016 at: https://curve.carleton.ca/system/files/etd/b6aa7d5d-f44b-48d6-9ea9-5d0f92b8f7a7/etd_pdf/a7fc1a78dfe694530e8937c422d4851e/hanby-alongitudinalstudyofdynamicriskprotective.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Canada URL: https://curve.carleton.ca/system/files/etd/b6aa7d5d-f44b-48d6-9ea9-5d0f92b8f7a7/etd_pdf/a7fc1a78dfe694530e8937c422d4851e/hanby-alongitudinalstudyofdynamicriskprotective.pdf Shelf Number: 139593 Keywords: Offender Risk AssessmentPrisoner ReentryRecidivismReconvictionsRisk Management |
Author: Webster, Stephen Title: A Process Evaluation of the Structured Risk Guidance for Extremist Offenders Summary: In 2009 Her Majesty's Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS formerly the National Offender Management Service (NOMS)) developed and piloted the Structured Risk Guidance (SRG) for Extremist Offenders. The SRG process is divided into three stages: - planning and gathering information; - assessing potential areas of criminogenic need according to 21 factors which may be linked to extremist offending; and - considering the risk of serious harm in the context of an individual's beliefs, intent, motivation and capability. This report presents a process evaluation of SRG early implementation and perceived outcomes. Following this evaluation the SRG was revised in 2012 and has become the Extremism Risk Guidance 22+ (ERG22+). Aims and approach The aim of the process evaluation was to examine the use, systems and implementation of the pilot SRG for extremist offenders in prison and community settings. The objectives were: Understand the context in which the SRG was developed and implemented. Examine the implementation and delivery of the pilot SRG in England. Summarise any actions taken in regard to identified implementation of risk factors. Examine the extent of SRG interface with existing risk management arrangements. Inform a decision on further roll-out of the SRG, including recommendations regarding staff training, implementation and delivery processes and considerations for any future impact evaluation. Details: Manchester: HM Prison & Probation Service, 2017. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Ministry of Justice Analytical Series 2017: Accessed November 30, 2017 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/661787/process-evaluation-srg-extremist-offender-report.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/661787/process-evaluation-srg-extremist-offender-report.pdf Shelf Number: 148590 Keywords: Extremists Risk ManagementTerrorists Violent Extremists |
Author: Ekwall, Daniel Title: Value and incident categories for cargo theft in Europe: Analysing TAPA EMEA statistics Summary: Purpose of this paper To analysis the relationship between value (reported stolen value) and different incident categories in order to find patterns and trends in cargo theft within Europe. Design/methodology/approach The research is explorative as this type of research is missing in logistics but also deductive as it utilizes theories from criminology. The analysis is based on TAPA EMEA's IIS transport related crime database. The result is analyzed and discussed within a frame of reference consisting of theories from logistics and criminology. Findings There are seasonal variations of incident categories. This variation is found both between months of the year and the day of the week for many of the incident categories, but the patterns are different for different incident categories. Within this understanding there are many changes in hot spots, modus operandi, theft endangered objects and handling methods during time, but the basic theoretical frame of reference is still more or less the same. Research limitations/implications The research is based on theories deduced from criminology and logistics together with secondary data regarding cargo theft. The geographically limitation to the Europe is done of practical reasons whiles the frame of reference can be used globally for analysis antagonistic threats against transports. Practical implications This research is limited by the content and classification within the TAPA EMEA IIS database. Nevertheless, this database is the best available database and the reports comes mainly from the industry itself, represented by the different TAPA members how report their losses anonymous, nevertheless the quality of the data limits the possibility to make normative statements about cargo theft prevention. What is original/value of paper This paper is the first within supply chain risk management that utilizes actual crime statistics reported by the industry itself, in order to analyze the occurrence of cargo theft by focusing on the value of the stolen vehicle/goods in relation with incident categories. Details: Conference paper, 2012. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 14, 2018 at: http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:887489/FULLTEXT01.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:887489/FULLTEXT01.pdf Shelf Number: 150871 Keywords: Cargo TheftFreight IndustryRisk ManagementStolen GoodsStolen PropertySupply Chain SecurityTheft of GoodsTransport Security |
Author: HM Inspectorate of Probation Title: An Inspection of Northumbria Community Rehabilitation Company Summary: Northumbria CRC has built solid relationships with partners and representatives of those under probation supervision to develop its services. It also provides an impressive range of services to support people to turn away from crime. These are essential for delivering a successful probation service, and it is so pleasing to see them well developed here, although the CRC does need to make sure its services are easily accessible, especially for those who are disabled or attending after work. However, despite a stable, experienced workforce and strong, effective local partnerships, the quality of this CRC's work is undermined by a lack of sufficient attention to managing risk of harm. In common with other Sodexo CRCs, Northumbria has been unable to implement its operating model fully due to difficulties outside its control. Because it has been unable to introduce the Sodexo Offender Management System, the CRC has implemented an interim solution focused on Justice Star. This is a useful assessment tool, designed to engage the individual and help identify issues they need to work on, to avoid reoffending. This concentration on Justice Star, and therefore on reoffending issues, has led to a lack of focus on risk management, when of course there is a balance to be struck. In addition, attention to completing process tasks has been at the expense of critical analysis and the need to act to safeguard victims and potential victims. Experienced probation workers should strike the right balance between rehabilitation and public protection intuitively, but here, systems and other pressures are influencing that judgement unduly. This requires attention at all levels. The commitment we found to achieving high performance, combined with loyal, skilled staff and partners, provides the right ingredients for addressing this and other areas for improvement we identify here. Details: Manchester, UK: Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Probation, 2018. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 9, 2018 at: https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprobation/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2018/11/Northumbria-CRC-inspection-report-1.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmiprobation/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2018/11/Northumbria-CRC-inspection-report-1.pdf Shelf Number: 153894 Keywords: Case Supervision Probation Supervision Probation Workers Public Protection Rehabilitation Reoffending Risk Assessment Risk Management |
Author: Pattison, Deborah Title: Safeguarding Against Fraud, Waste, and Abuse: Whistleblower Protections and Tips Hotlines in Special-Purpose and Local Governments Summary: Savvy and opportunistic fraudsters increasingly target smaller governmental organizations. Insufficient transparency and disjointed accountability over controls nurture the hidden nature of occupational fraud and allow wrongdoing to escalate during decades of routine operations. Criminal sentencings confirm local government and education officials misusing their positions and placing their own interests above those of their communities. Both primary case studies - a municipal crime in the City of Dixon, Illinois and corruption inside Roslyn, New York's Union Free School District - illustrate how embezzling more than $65 million remained undetected over thirty years until tip disclosure. The extension of unmerited trust created insufficient segregation of duties among employees and low monitoring left public resources vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption. The project holds ternary importance for risk management since one-third of small entities experience fraud, traditional external auditing identifies fraud in less than five percent of instances, and receiving anonymous tips through reporting hotlines improves detection by up to 20% and reduces losses (ACFE, 2016). The project examined stakeholder speak-up strategies including whistleblower protections and tips hotline (WP&TH) initiatives to understand how organizational context, willful blindness, information access, and citizen engagement affect local governments focus on fraud detection and remediation. Case studies show WP&TH initiatives to be financially and operationally superior in identifying risk and promoting transparency in small local governments. Third-party, 24/7 call centers and anonymous, two-way dialog web/text are underutilized tools for recognizing fraud precursors and stopping them before they aggregate, escalate, or become institutional norm. Details: New York, NY: Utica College, 2017. 134p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2019 at: https://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/1985001622.html?FMT=ABS Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/1985001622.html?FMT=AI Shelf Number: 154134 Keywords: Abuse of AuthorityAccountabilityCorruptionEmbezzlementFraudRisk ManagementTips HotlineWasteWhistleblower |
Author: Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee Title: Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Guidelines for Crowded Places Summary: Introduction Crowded places can pose a broad range of security challenges for their owners and operators. Terrorists and other criminals have, and will continue to, see crowded places as attractive targets for attacks both in Australia and overseas. Terrorist attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) often target crowded places such as public transport hubs, sporting arenas, entertainment precincts, and shopping malls. Government and private sector cooperation helps to ensure incident planning and arrangements are integrated and effective, while aiming to reduce the likelihood and impact of IED attacks. The Crowded Places Advisory Group (CPAG) has developed these Guidelines on behalf of the Australia New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC), with input from the Business Advisory Group (BAG). They should be read in conjunction with Australias Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism; Active Armed Offender Guidelines for Crowded Places, Chemical Weapon Guidelines and Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Guidelines. Purpose Those who own or operate crowded places are responsible for providing a safe and secure environment for the general public by applying well-informed risk and emergency management arrangements. It benefits everyone to stop or limit the consequences of an IED incident and quickly restore normal business activities. These Guidelines help people who own or operate crowded places to be more aware of the threat posed by IEDs. They also provide guidance on the issues and options to consider during risk mitigation and contingency planning activities. Australias Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism sets out several guiding principles for public and private sector stakeholders to reduce their vulnerability to the threat of terrorism. These Guidelines supplement the Strategy with key emphasis on the following two principles: - Prevention and preparedness arrangements should be underpinned by an intelligence- led, risk management approach; and - Effective security outcomes in complex environments where large crowds gather require cooperation and coordination between all stakeholders. Details: Canberra, Australia: Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee, 2017. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 9, 2019 at: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/IED-Guidelines/IED-guidelines-crowded-places.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Securityandyourcommunity/Pages/australias-strategy-for-protecting-crowded-places-from-terrorism.aspx Shelf Number: 154373 Keywords: AustraliaCounterterrorismCrowded PlacesCrowded Places Advisory GroupEntertainment VenuesImprovised Explosive DevicesNew ZealandRisk ManagementRisk MitigationRisky Facilities |
Author: Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee Title: Hostile Vehicle Guidelines for Crowded Places Summary: Who should read this and why - vehicles as weapons This publication provides an overview of hostile vehicle mitigation to all owners and operators responsible for the management of crowded places. It offers insight into how protective measures can be integrated into public and private places in order to mitigate and reduce the impact of vehicles being used as weapons. Owners and operators of crowded places want their site to be as safe as reasonably possible for their staff and the public. Organisational reputation, business continuity, and legal requirements for publicly accessible areas to be safe are all important reasons for owners and operators to understand and mitigate the risk posed by hostile vehicles. The aim of this document is to provide those responsible for crowded places with knowledge to inform security design considerations and decisions. It is intended to be a starting point to the development of effective and aesthetically complementary designs that help protect crowded places from hostile vehicles. Details: Canberra, Australia: 2017. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 9, 2019 at: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/hostile-vehicle-guidelines-crowded-places.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/hostile-vehicle-guidelines-crowded-places.pdf Shelf Number: 154374 Keywords: AustraliaCounterterrorismCrowded PlacesHostile VehiclesNew ZealandRisk ManagementRisk MitigationTerrorismTerrorist AttacksVehicles as Weapons |
Author: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) Title: Tackling Vulnerability in the Informal Economy Summary: A majority of workers in the world are informally employed and contribute to economic and social development through market and non-market activities that are not protected, regulated, well-recognised or valued. This study provides an in-depth diagnosis of informality and the vulnerability prevailing in the informal economy. It explores new ideas to improve the lives of workers in the informal economy based on the ILO indicators of informality and the new OECD Key Indicators of Informality based on Individuals and their Household (KIIbIH). The report contributes in four ways to the global debate on the transition from the informal to the formal economy: 1) by examining the multiple faces of informality in a large sample of countries representing diverse conditions, locations and stages of development; 2) by presenting new empirical evidence on the links between informality and the development process; 3) by assessing risks and vulnerabilities in the informal economy, such as poverty and occupational risks, which can be mitigated with social protection and appropriate risk management instruments; 4) by showing that the transition to formality is a complex issue that touches on a wide range of policy domains. Details: Paris: Organisation for Cooperation and Development, Development Centre Studies, 2019. 172p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 23, 2019 at: http://www.oecd.org/publications/tackling-vulnerability-in-the-informal-economy-939b7bcd-en.htm Year: 2019 Country: International URL: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/939b7bcd-en.pdf?expires=1558625792&id=id&accname=oid006203&checksum=D774D7D9695351479BB9C3BE176B6B50 Shelf Number: 156024 Keywords: Empirical Analysis Informal Economy Informal Employment Risk Management |